Starlink, Iridium, BGAN. Picking satellite comms for NGO field operations.

The three categories of satellite communication

Starlink

Low-earth-orbit satellite broadband. The terminal is the size of a pizza box. Throughput is comparable to home broadband, latency is below 50 milliseconds, and the service is sold as a consumer or business subscription. Coverage extends to most of the planet’s land mass and to expanding ocean regions. The footprint over Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia has grown substantially through 2024 and 2025.

The exposure profile of Starlink is mixed. The traffic is encrypted in transit. The metadata is held by SpaceX. The geolocation of the terminal is precisely known to SpaceX (the system requires it; the terminal coordinates with the satellites continuously). The service has been turned off in specific regions at specific times in response to government and SpaceX corporate decisions, which is operationally relevant for missions that depend on connectivity continuity.

The other piece: importing a Starlink terminal into a country that has not licensed Starlink is, in many jurisdictions, a regulated or prohibited activity. The legal exposure for an NGO operating an unlicensed terminal varies from administrative fine to criminal prosecution depending on the host country. Several documented cases through 2025 have made the point.

Iridium

Lower-bandwidth satellite voice and data, with global coverage including the poles. The handset is the size of a brick. The service is sold per-minute and per-megabyte at substantially higher prices than Starlink. The latency is acceptable for voice; the data rate is too slow for modern web use but adequate for SMS, GPS coordination, and basic email.

Iridium’s exposure profile is the cleanest of the three for many NGO use cases. The service is decades old, the legal regime is established, and the architecture is widely understood. Iridium handsets work in essentially every country without import or licensing problems. The voice channel is encrypted at a baseline level that has known weaknesses; the gateway-side decryption means the carrier has access to call content. For routine field coordination that does not contain sensitive operational substance, Iridium is operationally fine.

For sensitive substance, the Iridium voice channel is not the place. The text channel and data channel can be wrapped with end-to-end encryption (Signal does not run over Iridium data due to bandwidth limits, but specialized E2EE tools that work over low-bandwidth channels do exist). The pattern is to use Iridium for the channel and a separate end-to-end encryption layer for the substance.

BGAN (Inmarsat)

Broadband Global Area Network. Inmarsat geostationary satellites with a portable terminal that fits in a backpack. Bandwidth between Iridium and Starlink. Latency is higher than Starlink due to the geostationary orbit. Coverage is global except the poles. Use is regulated and licensed; importing and operating BGAN equipment is governed by the same kind of regime as Iridium and is generally accepted in most countries.

BGAN is the standard for international news organizations and large humanitarian operations. The terminals are familiar to customs officials, the carrier is familiar to host governments, and the service has a long-established track record. The exposure profile is similar to Iridium for the metadata-side and similar to Starlink for the in-transit encryption side. The use case overlap with Starlink is real; the operational difference is in the legal frame and the deployment friction.

The decision matrix

The choice is not which is best in the abstract. The choice is which fits the mission profile.

Static base of operations in a region with reasonable rule of law and sufficient permissions: Starlink. The bandwidth and the cost-per-byte advantages are substantial for ongoing operations. The licensing question is solvable when the host country recognizes the service.

Mobile field team in a region where Starlink is not licensed and the team’s presence is openly declared: BGAN. The terminal travels, the licensing is handled, the bandwidth is adequate for the field reporting and coordination tasks of most NGO work.

Field operations in a region where the team’s presence is sensitive, where carrying obviously-satellite equipment is itself a flag: Iridium handheld. The handset looks unusual but not categorically distinct from a large mobile phone. The bandwidth is sufficient for SMS, voice, and minimal data. The political and legal exposure is the lowest of the three.

Cross-border emergency contingency, where the regular channels are expected to fail and the team needs a guaranteed-functional backup: Iridium handheld plus a pre-positioned BGAN at a regional safe house, with a documented activation protocol. The two systems cover different failure modes, which is what makes the second one more than just duplication.

What the host country actually sees

Three layers of visibility apply, and they differ meaningfully across the three satellite systems.

The presence of the equipment is visible if the host country has any technical surveillance capability. Starlink terminals broadcast distinctive signals that are detectable with relatively simple equipment. BGAN equipment is similar. Iridium handsets are quieter but still detectable by determined adversaries. Operating any of these in a country whose government is hostile to your presence is detectable; the question is the level of effort the government would need to detect it.

The metadata is held by the carrier. SpaceX, Iridium Communications, and Inmarsat are all subject to legal requests under various jurisdictions. The metadata held includes terminal location, connection times, traffic volumes, and counterparties for non-encrypted services. The substance of encrypted traffic is not held; the existence of the connections is. The framework around what becomes producible under various legal demands is the same one we cover in cross-border data requests.

The substance of the communications is held only by the participants when end-to-end encryption is in use. The substance is held by the carrier when it is not. The decision about whether to layer end-to-end encryption (Signal where possible, specialized tools where Signal is not viable) on top of the satellite link is the operational decision that determines the actual privacy of the communication.

Operational baseline for NGO satellite use

The minimum operational discipline. Established teams add layers; teams that lack even this baseline operate with worse exposure than they realize.

1. Pre-deploy the import authorization

Whatever satellite equipment the team is bringing, the import authorization is filed before the equipment crosses the border. The customs officer who finds an unauthorized terminal at the border has to make a decision under time pressure. That decision rarely lands in the team’s favor when made under pressure, which is exactly why pre-deployment paperwork resolves it before the moment arrives.

2. Compartment the satellite link from the operational substance

The satellite link is a transport, and operationally sensitive substance has to travel over it with end-to-end encryption applied at the application layer: Signal where the bandwidth supports it, PGP for email where Signal is not viable, and specialized low-bandwidth E2EE tools for channels where Signal is too heavy. The transport and the encryption operate at different layers and have to be evaluated separately. The framework is the same one we cover in operational identity separation: layered protection beats trust in any single layer.

3. Plan for the day the satellite goes off

Starlink can be turned off in a region by SpaceX. Iridium and BGAN have geopolitical exposures of their own (less acute, but real). The contingency plan is the route the team takes when the satellite link is gone. Pre-positioned local SIMs that can be activated. Pre-arranged check-in protocols with a regional contact. The plan is documented before deployment and rehearsed at least once. The teams that improvise the contingency in real time produce poorer outcomes than the teams that planned it.

Frequently asked questions

Can we use a Starlink terminal in a country where it is not licensed?

Technically often yes, legally usually no. The terminal will work in most regions where Starlink has satellite coverage. The legal exposure is the question. Several countries have explicitly criminalized unlicensed satellite-internet equipment. Several have administrative fines. A few are silent on the question and the practical risk depends on the political relationship with the team’s host country. Get current legal advice for the specific country before deployment.

Is Starlink secure enough for sensitive operational substance?

The transport is secure. The metadata is held by SpaceX. The substance, if you wrap it in end-to-end encryption at the application layer, is private to the participants. For most NGO use cases, Starlink wrapped in Signal or equivalent is operationally sufficient. The exception is operations where the metadata of communicating with specific identifiable counterparties is itself sensitive; in those cases the additional metadata layer Starlink adds matters more than the bandwidth advantages.

The political risk of Starlink is a separate question. The service has been disrupted in specific regions at specific times. For mission-critical communications, the supplier’s political exposure is part of the threat model.

What about Thuraya and the regional satellite operators?

Thuraya is the regional operator covering Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Australia. The use profile is similar to Iridium with smaller global reach. For teams operating within Thuraya’s coverage region, the equipment is widely available and the licensing is generally established. Outside the coverage region, Iridium remains the cleaner global option.

Should we use cellular when available and only switch to satellite when cellular fails?

Generally yes, with one caveat. In a sensitive operating environment, the local cellular network can be more compromised than the satellite link the team is trying to avoid. The framework we covered in why most security setups fail in the field applies: the right channel for a specific message depends on the sensitivity of the message and the threat model in the operating area. Cellular is fine for routine logistics; satellite (with E2EE wrap) for substance that the host country must not see.

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There’s no perfect setup. Anyone selling you perfect is selling fear. The goal is simple: make yourself a harder target than the person next to you.